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GRIDLOCK,  LEGISLATIVE  SUPREMACY,  AND  THE
PROBLEM  OF  ARBITRARY  INACTION
Michael J. Teter*
INTRODUCTION
Gridlock has Congress in a headlock.  Gripped by stalemate, America’s
chief lawmaking body can barely muster the ability to make law.  Some argue
that this is as it should be—or, at least, as the Framers planned.1  In actuality,
rather than furthering the Framers’ vision, gridlock undermines many princi-
ples that, together, establish our governmental structure.
Specifically, gridlock threatens the fundamental constitutional doctrines
of separation of powers and legislative supremacy.  Moreover, as many schol-
ars have noted,2 the Framers were concerned with preventing arbitrary gov-
ernmental action.  Gridlock not only makes the arbitrary exercise of
governmental power more likely, but also implicates a new concern: the
problem of arbitrary inaction.  From tax cuts and the budget deficit, to immi-
gration policy, to taking up key executive and judicial nominations, gridlock
prevents Congress from acting on matters that undoubtedly rest within the
proper realm of the federal government.
My central thesis, then, is this: congressional gridlock threatens our con-
stitutional structure—both as originally constructed in 1787 and as it cur-
rently stands.  As discussed below, stalemate undermines the core
constitutional principles of separation of powers and legislative supremacy,
while heightening the risk of arbitrary government decisions—and indeci-
 2013 Michael J. Teter.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law.
Special thanks to the participants at the Symposium, as well as to my colleagues at the
University of Utah, for invaluable advice and feedback on earlier iterations of this paper.  I
would especially like to thank the Notre Dame Law Review staff for organizing the
Symposium—if only Congress could run as smoothly.
1 See, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, Op-Ed, Gridlock, or Democracy as Intended?, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
25, 2011, at 9; David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Op-Ed, Why Gridlock in Washington Is
Good, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2010, at A17, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/
05/news/la-pn-scalia-testifies-20111005; David G. Savage, Justice Scalia:  Americans ‘Should
Learn to Love Gridlock,’ L.A. TIMES, Oct. 05, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/
05/news/la-pn-scalia-testifies-20111005.
2 See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. R
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sion.  Though these core ideas are linked, I will discuss each concept in turn,
in hopes of better illustrating the constitutional problems posed by congres-
sional gridlock.
I. WHAT IS GRIDLOCK?
This Symposium rests on a basic premise: congressional gridlock
presents a problem serious enough to warrant a day and valuable ink spent
discussing it.  I agree.  But what is “gridlock?”  Put simply, gridlock—or stale-
mate, as I will use these terms interchangeably—is the inability of Congress to
make substantive policy decisions.3  In other words, the failure by Congress
to enact legislation is not, in and of itself, gridlock.  Nor are plummeting
confirmation rates for judicial and executive branch nominees necessarily
signs that the Senate is suffering from stalemate.  If Congress chooses to main-
tain the status quo or if the Senate decides to reject a nominee, that amounts
to a substantive decision.
But that’s not what is happening.  With increasing frequency, Congress
fails to make policy decisions.  For that reason, we’ve seen far fewer laws
enacted during recent Congresses than in the past;4 the percentage of nomi-
nees for whom the Senate takes no action is increasing;5 the number of clo-
3 This definition is taken largely from the work of political scientists who have studied
the concept of legislative gridlock. See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder, Going Nowhere: A Gridlocked
Congress?, 18 BROOKINGS REV. 16, 17 (2000) (characterizing gridlock as the “inability to
broach and secure policy compromise”); Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative
Gridlock, 1947–96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519, 519 (1999) (quoting Hamilton’s references to
gridlock under the Articles of Confederation in the first Federalist as an “unequivocal expe-
rience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Cynthia J. Bowling & Margaret R. Ferguson, Divided Government, Interest Represen-
tation, and Policy Differences: Competing Explanations of Gridlock in the Fifty States, 63 J. POL. 182,
182 (2001) (discussing the view that the U.S. government is “gridlocked and ineffective . . .
[and] cannot make significant policy changes or can do so only rarely” (citations omit-
ted)); George C. Edwards III et al., The Legislative Impact of Divided Government, 41 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 545, 547 (1997) (describing gridlock in terms of legislation that has been
“inhibit[ed]” or “obstructed”); Virginia Gray & David Lowery, Interest Representation and
Democratic Gridlock, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 531, 531 (1995) (describing gridlock as the govern-
ment’s inability “to introduce and enact legislation”); William Howell et al., Divided Govern-
ment and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945–94, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 285, 285 (2000)
(contrasting highly productive legislatures such as the New Freedom, New Deal, and Great
Society Congresses to those marked by “gridlock, paralysis, and legislative slumps”); David
R. Jones, Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock, 54 POL. RES. Q. 125, 125 (2001) (defining
legislative gridlock as “the inability of government to enact significant proposals on the
policy agenda”).
4 SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK
41 (2003).
5 See Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s Judiciary at Midterm: The Confirmation Drama
Continues, 94 JUDICATURE 262, 293 (2011) (showing the confirmation rates of judicial nomi-
nees across presidencies).
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ture votes is at record highs;6 and Congress is routinely turning to new
legislative procedures and gimmicks to overcome gridlock, but those often
serve only to allow Congress to avoid making substantive policy decisions.7
Moreover, gridlock does not always result in preserving the status quo.  It
depends instead on the default rules in place.  Take the recent example of
the tax cuts enacted during President George W. Bush’s first term.  Those
cuts were set to expire on December 31, 2012.8  President Obama and con-
gressional Democrats supported renewing the tax cuts for Americans earning
less than $250,000.9  Republicans preferred to extend the cuts across the
board.10  Despite the shared desire to maintain the tax cuts for most people,
gridlock nearly kept Congress from enacting any extension.  In that case, the
absence of a substantive decision from Congress would have been a change
in the status quo.
There are many possible causes of gridlock: congressional rules11—and
specifically, the Senate rules surrounding the filibuster12—gerrymandered
congressional districts,13 and a polarized electorate,14 to name a few.  The
purpose of this piece, however, is not to debate the causes of, and possible
fixes to, congressional stalemate.  Instead, the focus is on the constitutional
concerns raised by this period of acute gridlock, no matter its roots.  It is to
those problems that I will now turn.
II. GRIDLOCK’S THREAT TO SEPARATION OF POWERS
The separation of powers principle forms the core of our constitutional
structure.15  Though justices and scholars disagree about much of the con-
cept’s requirements,16 consensus exists as to the basic elements of the separa-
6 Data available from Senate Action on Cloture Motions, U.S. SENATE, available at http://
www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm.
7 Barbara Sinclair labeled such legislative maneuvering “unorthodox lawmaking.”
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING (4th ed. 2012).
8 Robert Pear, 6 Republicans Named to Congressional Committee to Reduce the Deficit, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/us/polit-
ics/11panel.html?_r=0.
9 Tom Cohen & Jessica Yellin, Obama Renews Calls for Holding down Middle-Class Tax
Rates, CNN (Jul. 9, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/09/politics/obama-bush-tax-
cuts.
10 Id.
11 See FRED R. HARRIS, DEADLOCK OR DECISION 151–58, 188 (1993) (focusing on the
committee system’s role in gridlock).
12 See id.
13 See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S WORSE THAN IT LOOKS 84–98
(2012).
14 See generally JOHN B. GILMOUR, STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENT (1995) (describing strategic
reasons for politicians to disagree with their counterparts).
15 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 412 (1996) (referring to the separation of powers as a
“skelet[al]” feature of the Constitution).
16 Compare Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 853, 853 (1990) (offering a “formalist” take on separation of powers), with Peter L.
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tion of powers doctrine.17  Specifically, the Framers built into the principle
two distinct—and in many respects, contradictory—functions.  First, the
Framers adopted Montesquieu’s vision of a government composed of three
distinct branches, each with its own legitimate sphere of authority, each serv-
ing separate functions.18  The Framers then complicated the simple division
of authority by combining the separate functions approach with a system of
checks and balances.19  This concept requires not separation, but intercon-
nectedness.  The branches check each other by involving themselves in the
others’ functions, at least partially.
While efforts to reconcile these two competing elements of a “uniquely
American”20 version of separation of powers have resulted in an “incoher-
ent”21 and “abysmal”22 jurisprudence, some clarity remains.  In particular,
for the separation of powers doctrine to fulfill its basic purposes, each branch
of government must be able to act—both to meet its functional responsibili-
ties and to check the other branches so as to maintain the proper constitu-
tional balance of powers.
With this understanding in mind, it is not difficult to see the threat that
congressional gridlock poses to separation of powers.23  First, gridlock pre-
vents Congress from acting—from fulfilling its functional role as the primary
lawmaking body of our national government.  The 112th Congress, for exam-
ple, enacted only 283 laws, far fewer than past Congresses.24  The 111th Con-
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Consis-
tency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492 (1987) (advocating a “functionalis[t]” approach to
separation of powers).  The jurisprudential dissonance extends so far, in fact, that on July
7, 1986, the Court announced two separation of powers opinions—relying on the same
historical sources and precedents to reach divergent outcomes.  In Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714 (1986), the Court took a formalist approach and struck down much of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Id. at 717–36.  In Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), the Court employed functionalist reasoning to uphold against
constitutional attack portions of the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. at 835, 857.
17 See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1127, 1147–52 (2000) (describing the separation of powers consensus among
scholars).
18 Id. at 1130–31 (discussing the two concepts within the separation of powers
doctrine).
19 See id.
20 M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 135 (2d ed. 1967).
21 Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1517–18 (1991) (arguing that in the realm of separation of powers, the Court has
“embraced no doctrine, endorsed no philosophy that would provide even a starting point
for a debate”).
22 E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 506 (1989).
23 In another, longer piece, I focus exclusively on the dangers gridlock poses to separa-
tion of powers. See Michael J. Teter, Imbalancing Act: The Constitutional Consequences of
Congressional Gridlock (Jan. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
24 All of the data regarding number of laws enacted comes from the Library of Con-
gress database. See Public Laws, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
LegislativeData.php?n=PublicLaws (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
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gress enacted 383 laws;25 the 110th passed 460.26  Indeed, if you look back at
the period from 1973–1993, Congress enacted an average of 629 laws each
session.27  The closest any Congress has come to the futility of the current
Congress was in 1995–1997, when it enacted 333 laws.28  These figures are
stark and only become more notable when one also takes account of the
economic crisis the United States faced during this period.  In other words, it
is not from the lack of a compelling need for legislation that Congress fails to
act.  It is gridlock.  Thus, a stalemated Congress means that the essential legis-
lative functional needs of the national government largely go unmet and, as I
will discuss later, push the executive and judiciary to fill in the gap.
Additionally, stalemate also negatively affects the other two branches’
ability to fulfill their own functions.  The federal judiciary is facing a vacancy
crisis that stems in large part from gridlock.29  The judicial emergency is
affecting the branch’s ability to satisfy its functional responsibilities in a
timely and efficient manner.30
The consequences reach into the executive branch, too.  For example,
in 2010, the Supreme Court invalidated nearly 600 decisions by the National
Labor Relations Board because the Board was operating without a quorum of
at least three members.31  Gridlock in the Senate that kept the chamber from
acting on several nominations to the Board was largely responsible for the
five-person Board dwindling down to two.32  A similar fate befell the Federal
Election Commission in 2007 and 2008, when it lacked the necessary mem-
bership to achieve a quorum.33  There again, Senate stalemate was the cul-
prit.34  Gridlock, then, not only hinders Congress’s own ability to function,
but negatively affects the other branches’ fulfillment of their constitutional
responsibilities.
Gridlock also frustrates the second element of separation of powers:
checks and balances.  The underlying purpose of this feature is to allow each
of the three branches to guard against efforts by the other two to aggrandize
25 Public Laws 111th Congress, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/LegislativeData.php?&n=PublicLaws&c=111 (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
26 Public Laws 110th Congress, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/LegislativeData.php?&n=PublicLaws&c=110  (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
27 See Public Laws, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/Legisla-
tiveData.php?n=PublicLaws (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
28 Id.
29 Current Judicial Vacancies, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudge-
ships/JudicialVacancies/CurrentJudicialVacancies.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
30 Michael Teter, Rethinking Consent: Proposals for Reforming the Judicial Confirmation Pro-
cess, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 297–99 (2012) (discussing the consequences on the judiciary’s
functioning as a result the vacancy crisis).
31 New Process Steel, L.P. v. N.L.R.B., 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2644–45 (2010).
32 See id. at 2638.
33 Paul Kane, FEC Nomination Impasse Stalls Disclosure of Bundling Data, WASH. POST
(Apr. 4, 2008), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-04-04/politics/36924400_1_dis
closure-rule-fec-new-disclosure.
34 See id.
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power or usurp another branch’s authority.35  The President’s main check-
ing power comes through his veto; the judiciary’s ability to check stems from
judicial review.  Congress’s check comes through its power to legislate: to set
the nation’s agenda through policymaking, to override presidential vetoes
and judicial statutory interpretations, and to provide meaningful oversight of
the executive branch.  Congress cannot perform this checking function if it
cannot make deliberative decisions.  Were one of the other branches
deprived of its checking power—imagine a President without the veto or a
judiciary without judicial review—the separation of powers problem would
be manifest.36  A legislature unable to legislate presents no less serious a
concern.
What practical effect does congressional gridlock have on checks and
balances and the separation of powers?  The starting point is to acknowledge
that Congress’s problems are not happening behind an iron curtain.  The
other two branches are well aware of the gridlock gripping Congress and, at
least in some instances, this emboldens the other branches to fill in the
power vacuum because they know that no inter-branch conflict will arise.
Thus, when the President ignores the War Powers Resolution—thereby
expanding executive power over an area constitutionally shared with the leg-
islature—Congress cannot check him.37  Nor can Congress assert its constitu-
tional authority when the President responds to a stalemate in the Senate by
recess appointing two National Labor Relations Board commissioners and
the head of the Consumer Financial Protection Board, justifying the action
by interpreting the Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause differently
than congressional leaders and parliamentarians.38  Gridlock also stymies
efforts by Congress to respond to statutory interpretations by the federal judi-
35 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 252 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
36 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3147 (2010) (striking down a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because the law created
a “multilevel” of protection for members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board to be removed by the President).  The Court noted that the tenure provisions lim-
ited the President’s authority and that, “in a system of checks and balances, power abhors a
vacuum, and one branch’s handicap is another’s strength.” Id. at 3156 (quoting Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 694 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  If the provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act making
members of the Board only removable for cause by the Securities Exchange Commission
presents a separation of powers concern, it is safe to conclude that depriving the President
of the veto would pose an even greater problem.
37 The U.S. military’s recent engagement in Libya demonstrates the point.  Despite
protests by both Republicans and Democrats in Congress that President Obama was ignor-
ing the War Powers Resolution, the military remained involved in the effort to overthrow
Muammar Qadhafi well past the statutory deadline imposed by the War Powers Resolution.
See Letter from Speaker John Boehner to President Obama on Military Action in Libya
(Mar. 23, 2011), available at http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-letter-
president-obama-military-action-libya.
38 See Jonathan Weisman, Appointments Challenge Senate Role, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2012, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/us/politics/experts-say-
obamas-recess-appointments-could-signify-end-to-a-senate-role.html?pagewanted=all.
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ciary.39  For example, were the judiciary to extend authority beyond its con-
stitutional role—through employing improper statutory interpretation
techniques, by ignoring limits on its jurisdiction, or by individual judges
refusing to recuse themselves despite clear conflicts of interest—Congress
could not step in to check the branch.
For these reasons, as well as several discussed in the next two sections,
congressional gridlock poses a real and significant threat to the constitu-
tional separation of powers.
III. GRIDLOCK JEOPARDIZES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
OF LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
The concept of legislative supremacy rests on the basic premise that the
legislature, as the most representative branch of government, should play the
leading role in setting national policy.40  In concrete terms, this principle has
come to mean that Congress should preside as the primary source of law as a
means of ensuring democratic accountability and statutory legitimacy.41
Additionally, legislative supremacy requires that the other branches under-
take their functional engagement with statutes in a way that respects Con-
gress’s authority over making law.  This second premise of legislative
supremacy largely focuses on the judiciary’s relationship with Congress and
applies most often in the context of statutory interpretation.  Its chief func-
tion is to encourage the judiciary to act as Congress’s “faithful agent”42 when
interpreting a statute.  In other words, the judiciary’s job is to interpret a
statute to meet Congress’s intent without regard to the judge’s view of the
best policy.
Gridlock undermines both elements of legislative supremacy.  Justice
Frankfurter once stated, “Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some
mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a
plan of government.”43  Legislating, then, is a vastly different enterprise than
executing and interpreting the policies.  Legislation seeks to address a
national concern with a national answer by initiating policy for the entire
country.  In many respects, “initiate” is the key—the notion that sets the legis-
39 Rick Hasen recently completed a study showing a dramatic decline in the number
of congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions. See Richard L. Hasen, End of the
Dialogue? Political Polarization, The Supreme Court, and Congress (Aug. 14, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
40 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1348–49 (2006) (criticizing judicial review on the ground that rights may not be
better protected by judicial review than through the legislative process and that judicial
review is democratically illegitimate).
41 Id. at 1349.
42 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 63 (1994) (arguing that through legislation society wishes to confine
judges so that they are “faithful agents, not independent principals”).
43 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
538–39 (1947) (explaining his objection to the use of the phrase “legislative intent”).
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lative function apart from that associated with the other branches.  In setting
policy, the nation, as a whole, should have a voice through the collective
deliberation of the legislative process.  Once the task of deciding policy has
been made, it deserves greater respect and commands more authority than
do the tasks of executing and interpreting.  The practical rationale for this
respect rests, in part, on the fact that national stability and transparency
require one source of law.  If each branch could rely on its own independent
judgment as to the best policy, no coherent and effective national policy
would emerge.  Thus, legislative supremacy treats Congress as the decider of
public policy and demands that once a decision is made, the rest of govern-
ment abide by it until Congress decides otherwise.
But why should Congress be the branch that sets national policy?  Put
simply, democratic theory demands that national policy decisions be made by
“those popularly chosen to legislate”44 and be respected by other governmen-
tal actors.  In other words, “[s]tatutory authority derives from its political
source.”45  The legislature—elected by and accountable to the people—must
be the branch responsible for making national policy.  When another branch
fails to abide by a constitutional legislative pronouncement, “it arrogates the
ultimate power to make public policy.”46
Legislative stalemate weakens Congress’s ability to serve as the primary
source of American law.  In part this is because of the simple fact that a Con-
gress that cannot act cannot legislate.  That does not leave the United States
ungoverned, however.  It just means that the executive branch often fills in
the policy vacuum.  For example, after gridlock prevented Congress from
enacting the DREAM Act,47 President Obama announced a new administra-
tion policy of issuing work visas to young, undocumented individuals who
arrived in the country before the age of sixteen and who met several other
criteria.48  This shift in policy was only the most notable in a series of execu-
tive branch unilateral moves that the Obama Administration unveiled as a
response to congressional stalemate.49
It’s not just that the executive assumes a greater lawmaking responsibility
because of gridlock.  Congress, itself, often responds to stalemate by pushing
44 Id. at 545.
45 Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35
STAN. L. REV. 213, 226 (1983) (discussing the difference between precedential judicial
authority and statutory authority).
46 Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281,
293 (1989) (“Violations of the supremacy principal are particularly serious because they
impair the basic social norm of democratic self-government.”).
47 DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010).
48 Christi Parsons & Kathleen Hennessey, Thwarted by Congress, Obama to Stop Deporting
Young Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/
jun/15/news/la-pn-thwarted-by-congress-obama-will-stop-deporting-young-illegal-immi-
grants-20120615.
49 Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-execu-
tive-powers-let-obama-bypass-congress.html.
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substantive decision-making onto newly created bodies.  The military base
closure commission,50 created by Congress in 1988, represents a useful exam-
ple.  For a variety of reasons, both political and structural, stalemate pre-
vented Congress from acting on base closures for over twenty years, despite
widespread consensus that bases needed to be closed.51  As a solution, Con-
gress devised the Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commis-
sion, composed of appointees selected by congressional leaders and the
President, to study and recommend closures.52  The Commission recommen-
dations would go to the President as a package and, if approved by him,
would be forwarded to Congress.53  The Commission’s closures would take
effect unless Congress acted by passing a disapproval resolution in both
chambers, subject to the President’s veto.54  In essence, then, Congress
reversed the veto-gates and used gridlock to ensure policy action, rather than
inaction.  But to make that work, Congress had to transfer a significant
degree of policymaking to an independent body over which Congress had no
meaningful authority—indeed, that was the point.
The BRAC law is widely, and correctly, viewed as a substantive success.55
Not every success, however, translates into a model solution for other
problems caused by stalemate.  Nevertheless, gridlock forces Congress to
turn increasingly to commissions, triggers, and automated policymaking as a
substitute for deliberative policymaking often associated with legislating.  For
example, as part of the 2011 debt ceiling showdown, Congress enacted the
Budget Control Act,56 which has two main features.  First, the law raised the
debt ceiling limit and permitted the President to initiate another raise in the
ceiling, with Congress being able to disapprove the raise through a joint reso-
lution.57  Additionally, the law established the Joint Select Committee on
Deficit Reduction, which was tasked with proposing $1.5 trillion in budget
cuts, with automatic cuts totaling $1.2 trillion taking effect if Congress failed
to enact sufficient cuts.58  As everyone knows, the “Super Committee” efforts
failed and, therefore, Congress was faced with trying to overcome gridlock
during the December 2012 lame duck session to avoid the $1.2 trillion in
50 Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub.
L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note
(2006)).
51 See Michael J. Teter, Recusal Legislating: Congress’s Answer to Institutional Stalemate, 48
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 8–12 (2011) (describing the problematic history of base closures).
52 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 §§ 2901(a), 2902(c), 2903(b),
10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (1994).
53 Id. § 2903(e)(2).
54 Id. § 2908.
55 See Kenneth R. Mayer, Closing Military Bases (Finally): Solving Collective Dilemmas
Through Delegation, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 393, 396–98 (1995) (analyzing the structure of the
base-closing process and the commissions’ procedural requirements).
56 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240.
57 Id. at 251.
58 See id. at 256–59.
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budget cuts from taking effect.59  As it turns out, Congress could only muster
delaying the budget cuts for two months.60  And though it’s certainly true
that Congress itself enacted these laws, that doesn’t change the fact that over
$3.2 trillion in economic policy will be set not by congressional action, but by
inaction.  Congress is forced to respond to stalemate by abandoning its
responsibility for driving national policy.  The President decides whether to
raise the debt ceiling.  A Super Committee attempts to negotiate a $1.5 tril-
lion deficit reduction, leaving no opportunity for the other 523 members of
Congress to alter the resulting policy.  If such an effort fails, automatic cuts
occur without Congress making an informed decision about the details of the
deficit reduction package.
All this because Congress knew that gridlock would likely prevent it from
acting to make substantive decisions.  Are policies derived from legislative
inaction entitled to the same authority given to substantive decisions?  The
underlying rationales for legislative supremacy suggest not.  Either way, it’s
clear that gridlock is threatening Congress’s role as the primary source of
national policy.
Stalemate also undermines the doctrine of legislative supremacy that
centers on the relationship between Congress and the federal judiciary.
Courts are the “honest agents”61 of Congress when seeking to determine
what a statute means.  The principle of legislative supremacy demands that
an interpreting court respect the fact that Congress enjoys primary responsi-
bility for making law.  Thus, “when legislation clearly embodies a collective
legislative understanding, the court must give way, even if its own view of
public policy is quite different.”62
Scholars and judges have long debated how courts should approach stat-
utory interpretation with an eye toward legislative supremacy, and my intent
here is not to jump into that fray.  Instead, I want to focus on one other
element of legislative supremacy as it relates to judicial statutory construc-
tion.  The legislature’s lawmaking supremacy includes the authority to over-
ride judicial statutory interpretations.  Assuming the constitutionality of a
statute, Congress is entitled to the “last word” as to what a statute means and
how it is to be enforced.  The judiciary recognizes this principle through vari-
ous canons of statutory interpretation and by envisioning the interpretative
59 That was coupled with over $2 trillion in tax increases that were set to take effect
because of the expiration of the Bush-era tax cuts, thus combining with the automated
budget cuts to create a “fiscal cliff.” See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthoriza-
tion, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–312, 124 Stat 3296.
60 See Janet Hook et al., Congress Passes Cliff Deal, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2013, 1:42 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323320404578215373352793876.html
(“The compromise dodges one cliff, but it sends Congress barreling toward another.”).
61 Or, at least, they claim to be. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
9–10 (1997) (“[Judges are] in a sense agents of the legislature . . . .”). But cf. id. at 22–23
(arguing that the legislature’s intent is irrelevant and that the semantic meaning of the
statute governs).
62 Farber, supra note 46, at 292. R
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process as one of a dialogue between the courts and Congress.63  In this view,
if a court misinterprets a statute, Congress can correct it.  Courts often take
this further by applying “super strong” stare decisis to judicial statutory inter-
pretations and by relying on legislative inaction to validate past
interpretations.64
Congressional gridlock alters this dynamic by making it much harder for
Congress to correct statutory decisions with which it disagrees.  A recent
study by Rick Hasen shows that the number of congressional overrides has
dropped dramatically during this gridlocked period.65  Even those few suc-
cessful overrides help prove the rule.  For example, it took nearly a decade
for Congress to correct the Supreme Court’s restrictive and misguided read-
ing of the Americans with Disabilities Act, despite the fact that significant
support existed within Congress for an override much earlier.66
In short, congressional gridlock endangers legislative supremacy over
the ultimate interpretation of statutes.  In the dialogue between courts and
the legislature over a statute’s meaning, stalemate prevents Congress from
speaking, leaving the judiciary as the dominant voice in statutory
interpretation.
IV. GRIDLOCK INCREASES THE RISK OF GOVERNMENTAL ARBITRARINESS
The doctrines of separation of powers and legislative supremacy are
familiar founding principles.  For the remainder of this Article, I want to
focus on an equally important constitutional objective: avoiding arbitrary gov-
ernmental action.  Indeed, David Currie has argued that one of the chief
purposes of separating powers is to serve “as a powerful check against arbi-
trary action.”67  More recently, Lisa Schultz Bressman suggested that the
“separation of powers was intended not merely to require Congress and the
President to act independently of one another, but also to act in a nonarbi-
trary, public-regarding manner.”68  Bressman goes further, by identifying sev-
eral other constitutional elements that can be understood as ways the
Framers sought to prevent arbitrary governmental decisions, such as bicamer-
63 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31–32 (1982); see
also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630 n.7 (1987) (“Any belief in the notion of a
dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature must acknowledge that on occasion an
invitation declined is as significant as one accepted.”).
64 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 642–45 (4th ed. 2007); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the
Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1482 (2010).
65 Hasen, supra note 39, at 4. R
66 Chai R. Feldblum, Roundtable On: The Americans with Disabilities Act and the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 232, 239–40 (2008).
67 David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19, 19.
68 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Admin-
istrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 499–500 (2003).
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alism, presentment, and the jury trial provision of Article III.69  In short,
avoiding arbitrary action is a constitutional concern.70
I would add to that, however, that the Framers had another objective in
mind: devising a system that avoided arbitrary governmental inaction.  After
all, the problem that led to the convening of the Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia in 1787 was the inability of the government under the Arti-
cles of Confederation to act.71  Even when a large majority of delegates to the
Continental Congress agreed on a policy, often the government still could
not proceed.72  Thus, though it is true that the Framers paid careful atten-
tion to creating a governmental structure that would avoid an “excess of law-
making,”73 they also sought to devise a workable, effective, and energetic
national government.74  Moreover, for the Framers, when broad consensus
in support of a particular action exists throughout the system, government
should be able to act.75  It is certainly fair to debate what represents “broad
consensus,” but it is worth noting that the Framers intentionally avoided cre-
69 See id. at 500–03.
70 See id. at 468 (“[T]he concern for arbitrariness, a staple of administrative law, actu-
ally emanates from the constitutional structure.”).
71 See Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government: 1786, AVA-
LON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/annapoli.asp (last visited Mar. 7,
2013) (calling for a convention to draft a new constitution). See generally 1 1787: DRAFTING
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 84–157 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed., 1986) (providing Convention
notes discussing the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation).
72 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 22:
Congress . . . [has] been frequently in the situation . . . where a single vote has
been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements. . . . [I]ts real operation is to
embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and to
substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or cor-
rupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable major-
ity. . . . If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting
the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be
done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the
smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national
proceedings.  Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; con-
temptible compromises of the public good.  And yet, in such a system, it is even
happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things
will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be
injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated.  It is often, by the impracticability of
obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of
inaction.  Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon
anarchy.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 110–11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
73 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 315 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
74 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 448 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) (statement of James Madison).
75 See Teter, supra note 51, at 2. R
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ating supermajoritarian requirements for ordinary legislative actions.76  As
Madison wrote, requiring supermajorities for legislation would mean that
[i]t would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be
transferred to the minority.  Were the defensive privilege limited to particu-
lar cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen them-
selves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in particular
emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences.77
From Madison’s standpoint, then, a majority having to succumb to the
“unreasonable indulgences” of the minority represents, in most cases, gov-
ernmental arbitrariness.
What else constitutes arbitrariness?  Let me again turn to Professor
Bressman, since she has offered the most precise definition I’ve encountered.
Arbitrary decision-making “is not rational, predictable, or fair. . . . [I]t gener-
ates conclusions that do not follow logically from the evidence, rules that give
no notice of their application, or distinctions that violate basic principles of
equal treatment.”78  The same can be said for arbitrary indecision or inac-
tion—that it is not “rational, predictable, or fair.”  Moreover, given the Fram-
ers’ interest in devising a system that would function, it seems appropriate to
say that congressional inaction is arbitrary when general consensus to act
exists and yet Congress does not act.
Gridlock—the failure by Congress to make policy decisions—implicates
concerns over arbitrary inaction in a variety of ways.  When a president nomi-
nates an individual to serve on the federal judiciary or in the executive
branch, the primary threat to the person’s confirmation is not rejection by
the Senate, but rather the failure by the upper chamber to make any substan-
tive decision.  Again, the distinction must be drawn between affirmative rejec-
tion of a nominee and the failure to act at all.  The former is not a symptom
of gridlock—the Senate, in the instance of voting against a nominee—has
made a substantive decision.  However, when the Senate fails to take up and
decide a nomination, that nominee is a casualty of the system’s gridlock,
which is becoming more and more pronounced.  There does not appear to
be any “rational, predictable, or fair” explanation for which nominees will
reach a substantive decision by the Senate and which will go unacted upon.
In the past, some semblance of “rules” that “gave notice” and ensured some-
thing akin to “equal treatment” existed.  For example, support from both
home state senators nearly guaranteed action on a district court nomina-
tion.79  No longer.  Previously, a positive evaluation by the American Bar
76 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 299–300 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see
also Bruce Ackerman et al., Comment, An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J.
1539, 1540–44 (1995) (discussing the framer’s intent to not require a supermajority in
arguing against a proposal to amend the House Rules to require tax increases to command
a three-fifths majority to pass).
77 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 76, at 299. R
78 Bressman, supra note 68, at 496. R
79 See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT 75–78 (2005).
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Association went far in ensuring a vote on the merits.80  Not anymore.81  The
judicial confirmation process has become something of a crapshoot, where
someone could be denied a vote before the Senate for no apparent or pre-
dictable reasons.  It’s a roll of the dice—and what’s more arbitrary than that?
Arbitrary inaction isn’t limited to the judicial and executive branch con-
firmation process.  Many pieces of legislation that enjoy bipartisan majority
support nevertheless succumb to congressional gridlock.  In 2008, for exam-
ple, Senator Tom Coburn placed holds on more than eighty pieces of legisla-
tion, many already having passed the House of Representatives with
unanimous or near-unanimous support.82  As a response to Senator
Coburn’s single-senator-induced gridlock, Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid packaged thirty-five of the least controversial bills into one major omni-
bus bill.83  The effort to overcome the stalemate failed, as “only” fifty-two
senators voted for cloture, depriving Senator Reid of the sixty votes needed
to move the legislation forward to a decision on the merits.84  Many of the
senators voting against cloture had sponsored or co-sponsored bills within
the package.85  Had cloture been successfully invoked, it seems likely that the
legislation would have passed with a substantial majority.  Instead, a minority
of senators chose to protect the peculiar, idiosyncratic judgments of a single
senator instead of allowing the Senate a vote on the merits of the legislation.
What is more arbitrary than one person’s preferences preventing enactment
of bills supported by an overwhelming majority of the 534 other members of
Congress?  How much broader consensus is required for action than unani-
mous or near-unanimous agreement on a measure?  When gridlock prevents
Congress from acting despite widespread support for a proposal, arbitrari-
ness reigns.
Gridlock also pushes Congress toward establishing legislative mecha-
nisms that themselves are arbitrary and that often result in arbitrary policy
outcomes.  Consider, again, the ad hoc committees and triggers that Con-
gress relied on to overcome the stalemate that threatened our nation’s credit
80 See id. at 70–75.
81 See RUSSELL WHEELER, BROOKINGS INST., JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND CONFIRMATIONS
IN OBAMA’S FIRST TERM, 3 (2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
Research/Files/Papers/2012/12/13%20judicial%20nominations%20wheeler/13_obama_
judicial_wheeler.pdf (stating that American Bar Association “ratings appear to have a rela-
tionship, albeit tenuous, to confirmations”).
82 Carl Hulse, Democrats Try to Break Grip of the Senate’s Flinty Dr. No, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2008, at A1; see also Advancing America’s Priorities Act, S. 3297, 110th Cong. (2008) (pro-
viding the text of the omnibus bill proposed by Sen. Reid).
83 Hulse, supra note 82, at A1.
84 See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 110th Congress-2nd Session, U.S. SENATE, http://
www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110&ses-
sion=2&vote=00189 (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (providing the roll call vote for cloture con-
cerning S. 3297).
85 See David Waldman, Coburn Omnibus Coming Up for Cloture Vote, DAILY KOS (July 28,
2008, 12:15 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/07/28/558235/-Coburn-Omni-
bus-coming-up-for-cloture-vote?detail=hide.
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rating and economy.  Congress could not get past the gridlock to make a
substantive policy decision on the debt ceiling or deficit reduction.  Instead,
Congress’s “solution” was to create a super committee to try to negotiate an
answer while working against the threat that if Congress failed to enact a
deficit reduction plan by January 2013, automatic cuts totaling $1.2 trillion
would occur.  One could argue that passing the buck to twelve members of
Congress to work out a compromise and dividing automatic cuts equally
between domestic and defense spending without any explanation or study of
the effects of such a division was arbitrary in and of itself.  That’s not my
assessment, though, because such a definition of arbitrariness would prove
over-inclusive, encompassing nearly every legislative decision.  After all, poli-
cymaking is almost always an exercise in line drawing and that can often be
seen as arbitrary to some degree.  Instead, my concern rests with the fact that
gridlock forces Congress to create compromise procedures as a substitute for
negotiated substantive policy.
The problem this poses is twofold.  First, for all of its (many) faults, the
legislative process relies on inputs and follows paths that are generally well-
known and understood after 230 years of congressional governing.  In other
words, while the outcomes may seem like arbitrary line drawing, the process
itself is not.  Moreover, abiding by the traditional legislative process provides
some degree of transparency, accountability, and democratic control.86
Establishing a new, unknown set of legislative procedures to set national pol-
icy is akin to changing the rules in the middle of a football game because
neither team is scoring.  It may result in a substantive decision—or a higher
score—but not because of any “rational, predictable, or fair” standards.
Second, it’s rare for such mechanisms to work, as seen recently with the
super committee and with the Simpson-Bowles Commission.87  The failure
leaves Congress with one of two approaches to follow.  Congress could follow
the route it did with the Simpson-Bowles recommendations, which is to take
no further action and make no substantive policy decision—an arbitrary out-
come considering Congress’s recognition that a decision needed to be made.
Alternatively, Congress could take the approach it did with the super commit-
tee, by establishing triggers or other automated outcomes to make policy if
the ad hoc committee fails.  These automated triggers are substantive deci-
sions by Congress, but they’re being made without knowing whether they’ll
actually be necessary or take effect.  Legislators don’t have to weigh the con-
sequences of their votes and they can distance themselves from the results
because those outcomes occur only after some intervening failure on which
86 It is partly for this reason that the Court rigorously enforced the “finely wrought”
process of Article I, Section 7. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
87 Though the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (the Simp-
son-Bowles Commission, as it quickly became known) was officially created by Executive
Order, it grew out of bipartisan legislation. See Simpson-Bowles Budget Plan (National Commis-
sion on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/refer-
ence/timestopics/organizations/n/national_commission_on_fiscal_responsibility_and_re
form/index.html (last updated Apr. 4, 2013).
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members can place blame.  Limiting the efficacy of Congress’s “decision,”
blurring the link between the decision and its policy consequences, and
reducing the ability for an electorate to hold representatives accountable cre-
ates a greater risk of arbitrary decision-making.
Furthermore, as the deficit reduction effort shows, such mechanisms
take time to complete.  This means, then, that the “substantive” trigger deci-
sion that Congress did make in August 2011 will not take effect until January
2013.  It was impossible for Congress in August 2011 to know what shape the
economy would be in by January 2013, nor whether the Bush-era tax cuts
would also expire, and whether America would be facing a “fiscal cliff,”
whether the country would be on safe economic ground, or whether we
would have already fallen into the ravine.  But triggers are triggers, and
gridlock makes it exceedingly difficult for Congress to undo what it has set in
place, even if the context has changed dramatically and even if a large major-
ity in Congress prefers to change the policy.  In other words, Congress most
likely would not have voted for the substantive policy of $1.2 trillion in
budget cuts split evenly between domestic and defense spending in August
2011, and a majority in Congress would like to alter the decision now, but
can’t.  Yet, because gridlock forced Congress to turn to alternative legislative
mechanisms to tie its own hands, we are stuck (at the moment) with this
outcome—an arbitrary one, supported by no theory of democracy or govern-
ance of which I’m aware.
Thus, congressional gridlock not only leads to arbitrary inaction, but
arbitrary action, as well.  The Framers intended to create a constitutional
structure that guards against governmental arbitrariness.  The current stale-
mate undermines that founding principle and frustrates Americans’ rightful
expectation of a rational, reliable, and fair government.
CONCLUSION
The policy consequences of congressional gridlock are real and often
maddening.  The constitutional implications of legislative stalemate are just
as real—though perhaps sometimes less clear—and significantly more troub-
ling.  America’s governmental system rests on the doctrines of separation of
powers and legislative supremacy, and is designed to avoid arbitrary govern-
mental action.  Moreover, each of these principles serves important objec-
tives that are central to the American concept of democracy and liberty.
As I’ve sought to show here, congressional gridlock undermines each of
these foundational pieces of our constitutional structure.  Recognizing the
threat posed by congressional stalemate is an important first step.  It’s time to
focus on ways to overcome the problem before the system collapses under
the stagnant weight of a gridlocked legislature unable to legislate.
